Balancing Power in Decentralized Governance: Quadratic Voting and Information Aggregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benhaim, Alon; Falk, Brett Hemenway; Tsoukalas, Gerry
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; Boston University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.08469
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: crowdsourcing; decentralized governance; decentralized; governance; information asymmetry; quadratic voting

摘要

In decentralized governance, quadratic voting (QV)-where the cost of acquiring voting power is convex-optimally aggregates voter preferences, outperforming simpler linear voting (LV) mechanisms when voters have complete information. But what if they do not? We show that uncertainty not only breaks QV optimality but can also cause it to underperform LV. Intuitively, this is because cost convexity can disincentivize betterinformed voters from adequately conveying their private information. The optimal mechanism varies with the distribution of stakes and information among voters, implying that QV's known advantages in preference aggregation do not readily extend to common-value information aggregation settings.