A Note on Corporate Provision of Public Goods

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Eichner, Thomas; Schopf, Mark
• 署名单位: Fern University Hagen
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2025.03558
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: public good; funding; Corporate social responsibility

摘要

Morgan and Tumlinson (2019, Management Science 65(10), 4489-4504) study a game in which citizens first fund a company venture or purchase bonds, and then bondholders and the firm's manager, acting on behalf of the shareholders, contribute to a public good. One of their major results is that the venture is funded with positive probability in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria. The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of economies in which the venture is not funded in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria.