The Tragedy of Complexity

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Oehmke, Martin; Zawadowski, Adam
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.08215
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Complexity; limited attention; attention externality; Financial regulation; communication in firms

摘要

Complexity can create value. At the same time, understanding more complex goods requires more of an agent's attention. We show that equilibrium complexity is generally inefficient when agents face competing demands on their limited attention. Because attention allocation is hump-shaped in complexity, equilibrium complexity is distorted toward intermediate levels: well-understood goods are inefficiently complex, whereas less well-understood goods are oversimplified. We apply our model to financial institutions facing regulatory bodies and CEOs interacting with corporate divisions.