The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements with Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sykes, Alan O.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-9300
• DOI: 10.1017/ajil.2019.25
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 482-534
• 关键词: regulatory takings; COMPENSATION; ARBITRATION; LAW

摘要

This Article argues that international investment agreements (IIAs) serve a dual economic function-to discipline host country policies that impose international externalities on foreign investors, and to curtail inefficient risks associated with agency costs, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and time inconsistency problems that uneconomically increase the cost of imported capital in host countries. It draws on the economic analysis to explain central features of IIAs and their evolution over time, and to address various controversial issues in international investment litigation.