EXECUTIVE UNDERREACH, IN PANDEMICS AND OTHERWISE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Pozen, David E.; Scheppele, Kim Lane
署名单位：
Columbia University; Princeton University; Princeton University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-9300
DOI：
10.1017/ajil.2020.59
发表日期：
2020
页码：
608-617
关键词：
摘要：
Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.