REWARDING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
van Aaken, Anne; Simsek, Betul
署名单位：
University of Hamburg; University of Hamburg
刊物名称：
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-9300
DOI：
10.1017/ajil.2021.2
发表日期：
2021
页码：
195-241
关键词：
Economic sanctions
HUMAN-RIGHTS
public-goods
behavioral economics
collective action
audience costs
loss aversion
carrots
IMPACT
RECIPROCITY
摘要：
Why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology and illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the rationale, potential, and limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist and psychological approaches. Both approaches provide ample justifications for making greater use of rewarding in international law.
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