FROM LEGISLATION TO REGULATION: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF AGENCY RESPONSIVENESS TO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yackee, Jason Webb; Yackee, Susan Webb
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8368
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 395-443
• 关键词: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES; Political control; Divided government; LAW; rulemaking; POLICY; ACCOUNTABILITY; nondelegation; INFORMATION; performance

摘要

When Congress authorizes government agencies to regulate, do they? One of the key questions in the administrative law and political science literatures has been the extent to which Congress controls the agencies to whom it delegates enormous lawmaking power. However, few studies empirically examine agency responsiveness to congressional delegations. Using an original dataset that links federal statutes to rules produced by multiple federal government agencies over a forty year period, we provide a novel empirical analysis of agency regulatory responsiveness to congressional statutes. We find that agencies promulgate legally binding regulations in response to only 41% of statutory authorizations to regulate. We also find that Congress can increase the probability of agency action by designating a regulation as mandatory rather than as permissive and by using procedural tools such as deadlines. Even with the use of such tools, we conclude that agencies are, at best, imperfectly responsive to congressional delegations. The study thus raises critical questions for our understanding of political accountability and democratic governance.