VOLUNTARY REMANDS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Revesz, Joshua
署名单位:
Yale University
刊物名称:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0001-8368
发表日期:
2018
页码:
361-408
关键词:
ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW
federal-government
rulemaking
agencies
arbitrary
appeals
COURTS
place
judge
reign
摘要:
This Article explores and critiques the administrative law doctrine of voluntary remand. When petitioners challenge an agency policy, the agency may ask the reviewing court to return the policy to the agency for reconsideration-effectively terminating the court's role in the case. Voluntary-remand motions risk agency opportunism and political manipulation but are nevertheless routinely and uncritically granted by courts. The Article explores the theory and history of voluntary-remand doctrine, observing that modern administrative law developments negate many of the doctrine's core assumptions. Accordingly, the Article calls for reassessing courts' willingness to grant voluntary remands.