ON NEGLECTING REGULATORY BENEFITS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sunstein, Cass R.
署名单位：
Harvard University
刊物名称：
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0001-8368
发表日期：
2020
页码：
445-459
关键词：
摘要：
The administrative state faces a pervasive problem: benefit neglect, understood as insufficient attention to the benefits of regulation. In 2017, for example, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13,771, calling for a regulatory budget of 30 and directing agencies to eliminate two regulations for every regulation that they issue. The order has two laudable ambitions: to reduce the stock of unjustfled regulations and to discipline the flow of new regulations. But because it entirely ignores the benefits of regulations and focuses only on costs, it is a singularly crude instrument for achieving those goals. In both theory and practice, it threatens to impose large net costs (including signcant increases in mortality and morbidity). It would be much better to abandon the idea of a regulatory budget, focused solely on costs, and to engage instead in two sustained but independent efforts: (1) a continuing look back at existing regulations, with the goal of simplifying or eliminating those that are unwarranted, and (2) cost-benefit discipline for new regulations. A third goal, no less important than (1) and (2), should be a very high priority, which is to produce institutional mechanisms to overcome potential agency torpor or capture, and to promote issuance of regulations that would have high net benefits (including reductions in mortality and morbidity). Congress, courts, and the Executive Branch should take steps to combat benefit neglect.