Optimization and its discontents in regulatory design: Bank regulation as an example

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Simon, William H.
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01069.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 3-21
• 关键词: state

摘要

Economists and lawyers trained in economics tend to speak about regulation from a perspective organized around the basic norm of optimization. In contrast, an important managerial literature espouses a perspective organized around the basic norm of reliability. The perspectives are not logically inconsistent, but the economist's view sometimes leads in practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of complex judgment and learning. Drawing on a literature often ignored by economists and lawyers, I elaborate the contrast between the optimization and reliability perspectives. I then show how the contrast illuminates current discussions of the reform of bank regulation.