Ambiguity and relational signals in regulator-regulatee relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Etienne, Julien
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01160.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 30-47
• 关键词: responsive regulation; INTERPERSONAL-TRUST; authority

摘要

Responsive Regulation translated an ongoing academic debate about behavior orientation and regulatory enforcement into a synthetic framework. Yet ethnographic studies reveal that ambiguity pervades regulatorregulatee interactions and suggest that the reality of regulatory encounters may be too ambivalent to fit the picture of the regulatory game at the heart of Ayres and Braithwaite's theory. This article proposes to address this ambivalence by drawing the outline of a relational signaling approach to regulatory encounters. The regulatory game is deconstructed into several ideal types of regulatorregulatee relationships. Within each ideal type ambiguity is managed with relational signals, namely behaviors that take a specific signification depending on the nature of the relationship. A relational signaling approach can account for the varying meanings of cooperation, defection, and mutual social control across different regulatorregulatee dyads.