Understanding corruption in regulatory agencies: The case of food inspection in Saudi Arabia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Al-Mutairi, Saad; Connerton, Ian; Dingwall, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; Nottingham Trent University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12247
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 507-519
• 关键词: organizations; bureaucracy

摘要

Corruption is a relatively neglected topic in studies of regulatory agencies. The label is applied to a wide range of deviations from behavioral standards ultimately derived from Weber's account of the ideals of Prussian bureaucracy. This paper draws on a study of the work of Saudi Food Inspectors to argue that it is unhelpful to reduce a complex phenomenon to simple allegations of malpractice that can be managed by disciplinary sanctions. Our data show that irregular behavior by street-level agents may be deeply embedded in the expectations that members of a society have of one another. It is less a matter of personal gain than of maintaining one's recognition as a fellow citizen. Such behavior is not easily changed through sanctions directed at individual inspectors. Our study does not exclude the possibility that irregular behavior can be motivated by personal gain, and properly managed by criminal or similar penalties. However, it does propose that research should be more sensitive to the contexts within which irregular behavior occurs rather than treating corruption as a uniform and homogenous phenomenon.