How regulations undervalue occupational fatalities

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Viscusi, W. Kip; Cramer, Robert J.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12445
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: WORKERS COMPENSATION; osha enforcement; safety; injuries

摘要

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration establishes incentives for safety by setting and enforcing regulatory standards. Using four and a half decades of inspection data, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors underpinning penalties following fatalities. The fatality premium for regulatory violations following a worker death is quite modest and is several orders of magnitude below the value-of-a-statistical-life figure needed to establish efficient levels of deterrence in the absence of all other financial incentives. Although there are low statutory caps on penalties, only 8% of the penalties for violations involving fatalities are constrained by the cap, suggesting that current statutes establish norms for reasonable penalty amounts. In situations involving a fatality at firms with union representation during the inspection, the enforcement sanctions are more stringent. Fatalities involving migrant laborers are less heavily penalized.