Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abbott, Kenneth W.; Genschel, Philipp; Snidal, Duncan; Zangl, Bernhard
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; European University Institute; University of Oxford; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12434
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: S83-S101
• 关键词: politics

摘要

Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type - Opportunists, motivated solely by self-interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyalties - both for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.