The multi-agencies dilemma of delegation: Why do policymakers choose one or multiple agencies for financial regulation?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moschella, Manuela; Pinto, Luca
• 署名单位: Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12435
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1250-1264
• 关键词: central bank independence; political-economy; global diffusion; veto players; credibility; DYNAMICS; GLOBALIZATION; institutions; uncertainty; WORLD

摘要

The article asks the following question: Why do policymakers choose one (or more) agent(s) to perform new delegated policy functions? In order to shed light on the factors that drive policymakers' choice of a single or a multiple agencies delegation framework, the article investigates policymakers' choice to delegate macroprudential regulatory responsibility to either the central bank or to a committee made up of more than one financial regulator. Based on the analysis of an original dataset in 53 countries, we show that the choice among alternative delegation frameworks is driven by the logic of policy control: policymakers, who want to control policies with distributive consequences, choose the single agency model under conditions of political uncertainty and low agency independence.