The Governor's Dilemma and Regime Complexity: Diversification and Differentiation

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Hagebolling, David
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.70091
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: institutions; governance; ORCHESTRATION; DELEGATION

摘要

States, firms, and other types of governors routinely rely on intermediaries to govern issues on their behalf. Such indirect governance drives regime complexity: governors frequently enlist multiple intermediaries for governing an issue. I theorize that governors foster complexity to maximize utility from indirect governance. When governors enlist intermediaries, they face the governor's dilemma: a tradeoff between the competence they can obtain and the control they can exert, I identify two strategies for mitigating this dilemma. Diversification creates competition among intermediaries providing similar competencies to prevent drift and slack. Differentiation promotes complementarity among intermediaries to exploit variation in the control elasticity of different competency types. In each case, governors increase regime complexity to obtain a preferred combination of competence and control. I illustrate my argument with examples from international cooperation. I conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of the article's findings for international relations and political science scholarship.