More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ershova, Anastasia
• 署名单位: Queens University Belfast
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12652
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1122-1136
• 关键词: european integration; public-opinion; POLICY; Blame; COMMISSION; council; institutions; INFORMATION; UNION; state

摘要

Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame-shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative discretion granted to agents. Proposals for expanding EU authority increase the likelihood of the exclusively supranational implementation path being selected by the principals while undermining the appeal of the national path. In contrast, aiming to preserve opportunities for blame-shifting while maintaining some degree of control over implementation, the EU principals increasingly turn to joint delegation, where the Commission and national administrations cooperate. Yet, even within the partner-like relationship of joint implementation, national agents enjoy broader discretionary leeway.