Is Lobbying for Losers?: Corporate Behavior and Canadian Military Procurement Contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Migone, Andrea; Chen, David; Evans, Bryan; Howlett, Alex; Howlett, Michael
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University; University of Toronto; Toronto Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12658
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 558-582
• 关键词: DEFENSE; industry; access

摘要

Lobbying is a multi-faceted phenomenon that involves interest groups and corporations contacting politicians and officials in order to try to achieve their policy preferences. While interest group policy-related lobbying has received a great deal of attention, studies of corporate contract lobbying are rarer even though this is a much older phenomenon. The article critically examines the commonly-held position that in the latter case lobbying is for winners; that is, that large scale corporate lobbying helps secure contracts that might otherwise have gone to a different firm. It argues instead that firms enjoying technological and other market-related strengths enjoy an insider advantage and lobby less than firms in more competitive situations. In other words that in many situations lobbying is for losers, a tool used by weaker firms trying to match or offset the technological and other advantages enjoyed by dominant firms. The article draws on government lobbying registers to examine recent defense-related procurement efforts in Canada to purchase fighter jets, naval surface ships, patrol vessels, and search and rescue aircraft and the contract lobbying they engendered. Evidence from the four cases provides support for the loser thesis with respect to large-scale technologically advanced goods but also the need to carefully define what constitutes an inside advantage allowing firms to forego or delay their lobbying activity, often until only after a contract has been awarded.