Subsidizing Unprofitable Industries: The Political Determinants of Agro-Industrial Policy in French Overseas Departments

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Joltreau, Thibaut
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12657
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: EUROPEAN-UNION; instruments; corporatism

摘要

Why do states subsidize unprofitable industries? This paper applies the Programmatic Action Framework and adapts it to neocorporatist settings to uncover the political determinants of industrial policies. Empirically, it explores how a longstanding coalition of economic, administrative and political actors has maintained public funding for the sugarcane agro-industry in French overseas departments, despite new policy objectives for agricultural diversification and subsidy reallocation. Drawing on extensive archival and interview data, I argue that this tripartite programmatic group has leveraged long-term institutionalized structures to resist subsidy reform and secure support for sugarcane production. Through coordinated discursive strategies to counter transformative policy proposals, and relational tactics to exclude challenging actors from the policy venue, each subgroup of this coalition has preserved its social position and the associated political resources gained from policymaking. These findings suggest that innovative policy reform in such sectors will require new public-private alliances capable of challenging entrenched programmatic groups.