Administrative Sanctions and Loose Legal Norms: Resistance and Street-Level Policy Reversal in Norway

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Gezelius, Stig S.
• 署名单位: University of South-Eastern Norway; Norwegian Institute of Bioeconomy Research
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.70011
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE; legitimacy; management; failures; LIMITS

摘要

How do provisions for administrative sanctioning affect the implementation of loose legal norms? To streamline regulation, governments have increased their penal capacity by authorizing administrative sanctioning, and they have decentralized regulatory responsibility by loosening legal norms. A case study of Norway's animal welfare governance shows how using administrative sanctions to enforce loose legal norms led to unpredictable sanctioning and, thereby, subverted regulatees' trust in law enforcement. Ensuing resistance from regulatees pressured inspectors to regain legitimacy by tightening loose legal norms and by backing down on administrative sanctioning. Inspectors thus reversed streamlining policies to protect the primary purpose of their profession: to motivate compliance with animal welfare law. The case highlights unintended consequences of streamlining regulation. It also illustrates how frontline workers may protect their primary purpose by disregarding policies they perceive as disruptive.