ZERO-SUM REPEATED GAMES: COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE ASYMPTOTIC VALUE AND THE CONJECTURE maxmin = lim vn

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ziliotto, Bruno
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: ANNALS OF PROBABILITY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0091-1798
• DOI: 10.1214/14-AOP997
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1107-1133
• 关键词: Incomplete information; one side; stochastic games; controller

摘要

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum repeated game, the asymptotic value exists, and the second one is that, when Player 1 is more informed than Player 2, in the long run Player 1 is able to guarantee the asymptotic value. We disprove these two long-standing conjectures by providing an example of a zero-sum repeated game with public signals and perfect observation of the actions, where the value of the lambda-discounted game does not converge when lambda goes to 0. The aforementioned example involves seven states, two actions and two signals for each player. Remarkably, players observe the payoffs, and play in turn.