POWER, STRATEGY AND GAMES - ECONOMIC-REGULATION OF A PRIVATIZED UTILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MELVILLE, A
刊物名称：
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-3298
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9299.1994.tb01019.x
发表日期：
1994
页码：
385-408
关键词：
摘要：
This article rejects conventional 'rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case-study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the 'rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage.
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