Political manipulation or feedback in English local authorities' standard spending assessments? The case of the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gibson, J
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-9299.00129
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 629-647
• 关键词: system; grants

摘要

The focus of attention in this article is on the major shift in Education Standard Spending Assessments, and with it central grants, in favour of Inner London which first took place in 1990, and has persisted since then. This coincided both with the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority and the transfer of education responsibilities to the Inner London Boroughs, and the introduction of the poll tax. The objective of this article is to test whether this shift in favour of Inner London was due to political manipulation or, instead, was another example of the long-established technical characteristic of 'feedback' in spending needs assessments in the English local finance system. A test is devised which distinguishes between these two explanations and involves the use of an Inner London dummy variable. The results provide strong evidence of political manipulation. The implications of this finding are considered.