THE PARADOX OF PERFORMANCE REGIMES: STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO TARGET REGIMES IN CHINESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Jiayuan
• 署名单位: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12197
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1152-1167
• 关键词: state capacity; management; numbers

摘要

Numerous studies have shown that rewarding or penalizing public officials for their performance in a mechanical fashion may have perverse effects, as evidenced by the strategic responses to imposed targets demonstrated by those exposed to the measurement process. Focusing attention on performance evaluation practices in Chinese local government, this research finds that implementing quantitative measurement in local authorities has triggered multiple strategic responses. Drawing on these insights from an institutional logics perspective, the study attempts to provide a theoretical account of the underlying mechanism that has led to repeatedly observed instances of organizational cheating.