How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, Susan M.
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12336
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 623-637
• 关键词: government performance; measuring citizen; management; INFORMATION; ideology; STATES; ORGANIZATIONS; DEMOCRACY; capacity; adoption

摘要

Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators' focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators' attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non-elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.