Organizational reputation and risk regulation: The effect of reputational threats on agency scientific outputs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rimkute, Dovile
• 署名单位: Leiden University - Excl LUMC; Leiden University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12389
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 70-83
• 关键词: europeanization; governance; KNOWLEDGE; POLITICS

摘要

This article aims to explain the variation in the scientific risk assessments conducted by two regulatory agencies: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES). To explain the merits of scientific risk assessments that have caused polarization within the EU, this article draws on bureaucratic reputation theory. The theory argues that regulators are political organizations that are active in protecting their unique organizational reputations. The findings obtained from interviews, direct observations, and primary documents yield support for this framework: depending on reputational threats, agencies choose to emphasize either their role as guardians of the prevailing social values, or send strong professional signals by delivering a scientifically rigorous risk assessment.