Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik; Mikkelsen, Kim Sass; Schuster, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of Southern Denmark; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12404
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 276-285
• 关键词: public officials; field experiment; wages; countries; state; politicization; DESIGN; MARKET; merit; city

摘要

Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies36 in totalthat do address civil service management and anti-corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areassuch as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practicesis largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.