Explaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hegele, Yvonne
• 署名单位: Leibniz University Hannover
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12537
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 753-768
• 关键词: Bargaining power; POLITICS

摘要

The core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision-making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources.