Money matters: The role of public sector wages in corruption prevention

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cornell, Agnes; Sundell, Anders
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12634
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 244-260
• 关键词: informal payments; doctors; bribes; gifts

摘要

Economic theory as well as conventional wisdom from corruption-ridden countries suggest that low wages among public employees lead to corruption, but cross-sectional empirical research has largely failed to confirm this relationship. In this article, we investigate the relationship between experiences of corruption and wage levels for public sector employees, utilizing both objective and expert survey data, with global coverage. The statistical analysis shows that higher wages, as compared to the average wage in the country, is associated with less corruption. There is also some support, but weaker, for the hypothesis that corruption increases when wages fall below subsistence levels.