The dynamics of de-delegation: A principal-agent explanation of the reversal of private authority in international sport governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geeraert, Arnout; Drieskens, Edith
• 署名单位: Utrecht University; KU Leuven
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12668
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 156-170
• 关键词: LEGITIMACY; POLITICS; POWER

摘要

What explains the reversal of transnational private rule-making authority? Embedding constructivist insights within a rational principal-agent model, this article advances a five-step sequential process that nuances the traditional explanation of delegitimation. It argues that entrepreneurs must first successfully promote the belief that the high costs of ineffective private policies follow from the private rule-setter's flawed institutional attributes. Subsequently, a de-delegation solution that minimizes transaction and uncertainty costs must be proposed. The examination of two cases in the field of international sport governance, namely the deliberate reversal of private authority in anti-doping governance and the lack thereof in anti-match-fixing governance, lends support to these propositions. It sheds new light on the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and explains why there will probably be no counterpart to fight match-fixing.