When does transparency improve public services? Street-level discretion, information, and targeting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bauhr, Monika; Carlitz, Ruth
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12693
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 500-516
• 关键词: field experiment; political connections; CORRUPTION; ACCOUNTABILITY; party; bureaucracy; ELECTIONS; education; benefits; support

摘要

Transparency has been widely promoted as a tool for improving public service delivery; however, empirical evidence is inconclusive. We suggest that the influence of transparency on service provision is contingent on the nature of the service. Specifically, we argue that transparency is more likely to improve the quality of service provision when street-level discretion is high. Discretion increases information asymmetries, and, in the absence of transparency, allows officials to target public services in suboptimal ways. Using finely grained data from the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index between 2011 and 2018, we show that communes that experience increases in transparency also experience improved quality of education and health (services characterized by greater discretion), while the quality of infrastructure provision (characterized by less discretion) bears no relation to increased transparency. The findings help us understand when transparency can improve service provision, as well the effects of transparency reforms in non-democratic settings.