Designing state clean air agencies: Administrative procedures and bureaucratic autonomy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Potoski, M; Woods, ND
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003499
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 203-221
• 关键词: POLITICAL CONTROL; congressional dominance; POLICY-MAKING; DISCRETION; DYNAMICS; POWER; MODEL

摘要

This study examines how administrative procedures structure the degree of policy influence different governmental and nongovernmental groups exercise in states' air pollution control programs. Drawing on a variety of data, including a unique survey of state air pollution control agencies, our analysis shows that administrative procedures affect the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and level of influence legislatures and interest groups exercise in state air pollution programs. Overall, the results suggest that hardwiring administrative procedures theories may be more accurate than fire alarm theories of legislative oversight.