For-profit welfare: Contracts, conflicts, and the performance paradox
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Johnson Dias, Janice; Maynard-Moody, Steven
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Kansas
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
1053-1858
DOI：
10.1093/jopart/mul002
发表日期：
2007
页码：
189-211
关键词：
摘要：
This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox-the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.
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