Contracting for Complex Products

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Brown, Trevor L.; Potoski, Matthew; Van Slyke, David M.
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Syracuse University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mup034
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: I41-I58
• 关键词: economics

摘要

A fundamental source of contracting failure is product uncertainty. When the product's cost, quality, and quantity cannot be easily defined, buyers and sellers are unable to clearly and completely define exchange terms. The risk is that the buyer is the only purchaser of this complex product, and once the contract islet, the vendor is the only supplier. The consequence is a collective action problem in which each party has incentives to exploit contract ambiguities for their own gain at the other's expense. We lay out the theoretical case for how complex contracting risks collective action problems. We then illustrate the theory's analytic value with the case of the Coast Guard's controversial Deepwater project, a major acquisition program to upgrade and integrate its fleet of air and sea assets. Through this case, we show how managing the state of agents requires understanding how different principal-agent relations' work.