Fishing in Muddy Waters: Principals, Agents, and Democratic Governance in Europe

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Skelcher, Chris
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mup040
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: I161-I175
• 关键词: institutions; performance; GOVERNMENT; networks; DESIGN

摘要

The evolution of new forms of public governance in Europe presents a challenge to methods of democratic policy making, accountability, and control that are predicated on a theory of representative democracy. The article discusses the evolution of supranational institutions and considers empirical data on the democratic performance of governance networks in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. it concludes that bureaucratic actors in the European Union and in subnational governance networks operate to a large extent as political principals, which would in the theory of representative democracy, promote and in some cases determine public policy. Governance networks present a special form of third-party government, with a high degree of autonomy in their specific jurisdiction. The article outlines research strategies for democratic analysis that do not presuppose representative democracy.