Agency Structure and the Distribution of Federal Spending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Sarah E.; Potoski, Matthew
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muw002
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 461-474
• 关键词: POLITICAL CONTROL; pork barrel; administrative procedures; CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS; POLICY; bureaucracy; allocation; DESIGN; INFORMATION; DISCRETION

摘要

Agency structure can shape agency independence in two ways. First, it can insulate agencies from policy demands from political overseers in Congress and the executive branch. Second, agency structure can shape the range of available options from which agencies can select policy. In this article, we present a novel empirical approach that evaluates both types of effects by modeling the mean and variance of agencies' policy decisions. Analyses of US distributive program spending across 10 congresses and 68 federal agencies show that agencies structured for independence enjoy a broader range of options from which to implement policy but are no less responsive to spending demands from members of Congress and the president.