The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Leiden University - Excl LUMC; Leiden University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muv022
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 507-518
• 关键词: central bank independence; global diffusion; DELEGATION; POLITICS; patronage; state; ACCOUNTABILITY; credibility; governance; survival

摘要

The past decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of regulatory agencies ( RAs) across countries and policy domains. To establish credible regulatory regimes, many RAs are formally shielded from direct political influence and thus enjoy high levels of legal autonomy. While granting formal independence to an agency may erect some institutional barriers to politicization, it also generates a strong incentive to appoint ideologically likeminded individuals to the agency leadership. An analysis of about 700 top-level appointments to over 100 RAs in 16 West European countries between 1996 and 2013 shows that individuals with ties to a government party are much more likely to be appointed as formal agency independence increases. Higher levels of legal independence are thus associated with greater party politicization-a finding that casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal independence as a tool to reduce political influence in RAs.