Citizens on Patrol: Understanding Public Whistleblowing against Government Corruption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Su, Xuhong; Ni, Xing
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Sun Yat Sen University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muy011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 406-422
• 关键词: Voluntary provision; social information; CHINA; determinants; intentions; BEHAVIOR; institutions; personality; agencies; Managers

摘要

Despite the importance of public whistleblowing, there has been little systematic inquiry into the topic. Combining objective and self-reported data, this study attempts to sort out the dynamics of public whistleblowing against government corruption, particularly distinguishing the antecedents of whistleblowing intention from those of actual whistleblowing acts and exploring anonymity decisions. A middle-range theory is proposed that highlights individual, situational, and institutional forces as they pertain to public whistleblowing. The results portray public whistleblowing to be driven by a complex array of competing motives and dynamics. The antecedents of whistleblowing intention are different in non-trivial ways than those of actual acts, with intention being prosocial motives and actual acts akin to voluntary provision of public goods. Institutional anti-corruption yields both complementary and substitute effects on public whistleblowing. The study concludes with discussing the implications for further theory development and practical guidance.