The Importance of Oversight and Agency Capacity in Enhancing Performance in Public Service Delivery

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drolc, Cody A.; Keiser, Lael R.
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muaa055
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 773-789
• 关键词: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT; legislative professionalism; police patrols; ACCOUNTABILITY; implementation; DECISION; STATES; responsiveness; INFORMATION; eligibility

摘要

Government agencies often encounter problems in service delivery when implementing public programs.This undermines effectiveness and raise questions about accountability. A central component of responsiveness and performance management is that agencies correct course when problems are identified. However, public agencies have an uneven record in responding to problems. In this article, we investigate whether, and to what extent, capacity both within the agency and within institutions performing oversight improves agency responsiveness to poor-performance indicators. Using panel data on eligibility determinations in the Social Security Disability program from US state agencies from 1991 to 2015 and fixed effects regression, we find that indicators of agency and oversight capacity moderate the relationship between poor performance and improvement. Our results suggest that investments in building capacity not only within agencies, but also within elected institutions, are important for successful policy implementation. However, we find evidence that while agency capacity alone can improve responsiveness to poor performance, the effect of oversight capacity on improving performance requires high agency capacity.