Agency Independence, Campaign Contributions, and Favoritism in US Federal Government Contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fazekas, Mihaly; Ferrali, Romain; Wachs, Johannes
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Vienna University of Economics & Business
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muac026
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 262-278
• 关键词: corruption; DESIGN

摘要

The impacts of money in US politics have long been debated. Building on principal-agent models, we test whether and to what degree companies' political donations lead to their favored treatment in federal procurement. We expect the impact of donations on favoritism to vary by the strength of control by political principals over their bureaucratic agents. We compile a comprehensive dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-15. We develop risk indices capturing tendering practices and outcomes likely characterized by favoritism. Using fixed effects regressions, matching, and regression discontinuity analyses, we find confirming evidence for our theory. A large increase in donations from $10,000 to $5m (in USD) increases favoritism risks by about 1/4th standard deviation (SD). These effects are largely partisan, with firms donating to the party that holds the presidency showing higher risk. Donations influence favoritism risks most in less independent agencies: the same donation increases the risk of favoritism by an additional 1/3rd SD in agencies least insulated from politics. Exploiting sign-off thresholds, we demonstrate that donating contractors are subject to less scrutiny by political appointees.