The interplay of discretion and complexity in public contracting and renegotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Domingos, Fernando Deodato; Heinrich, Carolyn J.; Saussier, Stephane; Shiva, Mehdi
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Vanderbilt University; RAND Corporation; RAND Europe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muaf004
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 148-163
• 关键词: transaction costs; incomplete contracts; performance; DESIGN; determinants; MARKET; price

摘要

This article investigates how the use of discretion in public-private contracts interplays with transactional complexity in influencing contract renegotiations. Motivations for contract renegotiations may be positive, negative (e.g., opportunistic), or neutral, and we argue that allowing discretion at the award stage may promote a more relational approach to contracting that fosters cooperation and productive adaptation. Using a dataset of 12,189 renegotiated contracts from the Tenders Electronic Daily eProcurement platform-based on European Union public procurement directives-we apply regression analyses and propensity score matching to examine how contracts are awarded and renegotiated. Our findings suggest that contracts awarded with government discretion are associated with renegotiations that are viewed more positively and less likely to be perceived as opportunistic. However, this beneficial role for discretion appears to be mitigated by contract transactional complexity, making this a critical consideration in efforts to improve the governance of provider relationships and increase public value. By integrating insights from incomplete and relational contracting theories, this study contributes to the public administration and management literature by demonstrating how discretion and complexity jointly shape contract renegotiation dynamics, informing governance strategies that balance flexibility and accountability in public procurement. Este artigo explora como a discricionariedade governamental e a complexidade transacional em contratos p & uacute;blico-privados influenciam as renegocia & ccedil;& otilde;es contratuais. As renegocia & ccedil;& otilde;es podem ter motiva & ccedil;& otilde;es positivas, negativas (como oportunistas), ou neutras. Argumentamos que permitir discricionariedade na fase de adjudica & ccedil;& atilde;o (quando o contrato & eacute; formalmente atribu & iacute;do ao vencedor) pode promover uma abordagem mais relacional, incentivando a coopera & ccedil;& atilde;o e a adapta & ccedil;& atilde;o produtiva. Utilizando um conjunto de dados com 12.189 contratos renegociados da plataforma de eProcurement Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), baseada nas diretrizes de contrata & ccedil;& atilde;o p & uacute;blica da Uni & atilde;o Europeia, aplicamos an & aacute;lises de regress & atilde;o e propensity score matching para examinar como os contratos s & atilde;o concedidos e renegociados. Nossos resultados indicam que contratos com discricionariedade governamental est & atilde;o associados a renegocia & ccedil;& otilde;es percebidas de forma mais positiva e menos oportunistas. No entanto, o papel ben & eacute;fico da discricionariedade & eacute; mitigado pela complexidade transacional, destacando a import & acirc;ncia de considerar esse aspecto ao aprimorar a governan & ccedil;a de parcerias privadas e aumentar o valor p & uacute;blico. Ao integrar insights das teorias de contratos incompletos e relacionais, este estudo contribui para a literatura em administra & ccedil;& atilde;o p & uacute;blica e gest & atilde;o ao demonstrar como discricionariedade e complexidade moldam conjuntamente a din & acirc;mica das renegocia & ccedil;& otilde;es contratuais, informando estrat & eacute;gias de governan & ccedil;a que equilibram flexibilidade e responsabilidade na contrata & ccedil;& atilde;o p & uacute;blica. Cet article examine comment l'usage de la discr & eacute;tion dans les contrats public-priv & eacute; interagit avec la complexit & eacute; transactionnelle pour influencer les ren & eacute;gociations contractuelles. Les motivations des ren & eacute;gociations peuvent & ecirc;tre positives, n & eacute;gatives (par exemple, opportunistes) ou neutres. Nous soutenons que permettre une certaine discr & eacute;tion & agrave; l'& eacute;tape de l'attribution du contrat peut favoriser une approche plus relationnelle, encourageant la coop & eacute;ration et une adaptation efficace du contrat. En utilisant un ensemble de donn & eacute;es comprenant 12189 contrats ren & eacute;goci & eacute;s issus de la plateforme de passation & eacute;lectronique Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), bas & eacute;e sur les directives europ & eacute;ennes en mati & egrave;re de march & eacute;s publics, nous proposons une analyse & eacute;conom & eacute;trique et un propensity score matching pour examiner comment les contrats sont attribu & eacute;s et ren & eacute;goci & eacute;s. Nos r & eacute;sultats montrent que les contrats attribu & eacute;s avec discr & eacute;tion gouvernementale sont associ & eacute;s & agrave; des ren & eacute;gociations per & ccedil;ues de mani & egrave;re plus positive et moins susceptibles d'& ecirc;tre jug & eacute;es opportunistes. Cependant, ce r & ocirc;le b & eacute;n & eacute;fique de la discr & eacute;tion semble att & eacute;nu & eacute; par la complexit & eacute; transactionnelle des contrats, soulignant l'importance de prendre en compte cet aspect pour am & eacute;liorer la gouvernance des relations avec les prestataires et accro & icirc;tre la valeur publique. En int & eacute;grant les perspectives des th & eacute;ories des contrats relationnels et incomplets, cette & eacute;tude contribue & agrave; la litt & eacute;rature en administration publique et en gestion en d & eacute;montrant comment discr & eacute;tion et complexit & eacute; fa & ccedil;onnent conjointement la dynamique des ren & eacute;gociations contractuelles, informant ainsi les strat & eacute;gies de gouvernance qui & eacute;quilibrent flexibilit & eacute; et responsabilit & eacute; dans la passation des march & eacute;s publics.