Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jensen, Christian B.
• 署名单位: University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01534.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 关键词: conditional agenda setter; european-union; Political control; Parliament; ENFORCEMENT; codecision; DELEGATION; CRITIQUE; POLICY

摘要

With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given to the administrative and delegatory consequences of changes in the EU's legislative procedures. This article examines how legislative institutions' preferences for limits to the implementing discretion of the Commission and the member states have changed with the shift from the cooperation procedure to the codecision procedure. I find that the European Parliament (EP) responded to the codecision procedure by increasing the share of its amendments that expand the implementing discretion of member states. Furthermore, the Council significantly changed its attitude toward EP amendments restricting Commission discretion.