Why Anticorruption Reforms FailSystemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Persson, Anna; Rothstein, Bo; Teorell, Jan
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg; Lund University
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 关键词: Anti-corruption; GOVERNMENT; DEMOCRACY; QUALITY

摘要

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Ugandatwo arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countrieswe argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principalagent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principalagent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.