Divided Government, Legislative Productivity, and Policy Change in the USA and France

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baumgartner, Frank R.; Brouard, Sylvain; Grossman, Emiliano; Lazardeux, Sebastien G.; Moody, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12047
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: UNITED-STATES; POLITICS; institutions; COMPETITION; Veto

摘要

The concept of divided government is more complicated than scholars have allowed. In the USA, truly unified government, where the president enjoys a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate as well as a majority in the House, is rare. In France, truly unified government has been more common, but divided government has also occurred several times. Democratic governance requires that parties address important issues and they do so regardless of the patterns of institutional control. Nevertheless, policy changes or important laws are affected by the higher level of institutional friction associated with divided government. Looking at both the USA and France, we find that periods of unified government show higher levels of production of important laws in the USA, but we find no difference for overall legislative productivity.