Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Matanock, Aila M.
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0952-1895
DOI：
10.1111/gove.12067
发表日期：
2014
关键词：
摘要：
Governance delegation agreementsinternational treaties allowing external actors legal authority within host states for fixed termssucceed in simple and, under certain conditions, complex state-building tasks. These deals are well institutionalized and have input legitimacy because ratification requires sufficient domestic support from a ruling coalition. In order to obtain that input legitimacy, however, host states constrain external actors commensurate with their level of statehood: Stronger states delegate less legal authority. This article argues that these constraints, which produce joint rather than complete authority, require external actors to work within state structures rather than substituting for them, and thus make coordination of complex tasks more difficult. A quantitative overview of data on consent-based peacekeeping missions complements a qualitative analysis focused on comparative case studies in Melanesia and Central America to test the theory. The results support the theory and suggest that these deals hold promise particularly for accomplishing complex tasks in especially weak states.
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