The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Busuioc, E. Madalina; Lodge, Martin
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12161
• 发表日期: 2016
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION; performance management; Political control; POLICY; agencies; targets; sector; work

摘要

This article proposes a reputation-based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioral predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely, principal-agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivaled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability-enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A reputation-informed theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing drift, or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountabilityin terms of both holding and givingis about managing and cultivating one's reputation vis-a-vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one's audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one's (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.