The Westminster Model and the Indivisibility of the Political and Administrative Elite: A Convenient Myth Whose Time Is Up?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Richards, David; Smith, Martin J.
署名单位：
University of Manchester; University of York - UK
刊物名称：
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0952-1895
DOI：
10.1111/gove.12225
发表日期：
2016
关键词：
摘要：
This article argues that the principle of indivisibility in the relationship between political and administrative elites acted as a central convention of the Westminster system for much of the twentieth century. It explores how in more recent decades this principle has been challenged by the shift to a principal-agent approach. It considers the extent to which this shift diminishes the traditional Westminster model's understanding of the minister-civil servant relationship as one based on a symbiotic interdependent partnership. In its place has emerged a more universal command and control relationship that is seen as necessary to meet the demands of modern accountability and transparency. Such a change has fundamentally altered a long-established power-bargain between ministers and civil servants and undermined a core tenet of the Westminster model.
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