The Political Budget Cycle and Subnational Debt Expenditures in Federations: Panel Data Evidence from India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saez, Lawrence
• 署名单位: University of London; University of London School Oriental & African Studies (SOAS)
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12130
• 发表日期: 2016
• 关键词: Macroeconomic policy; Fiscal federalism; business-cycle; GOVERNMENT; performance; PARTIES; ECONOMY; GROWTH; LIBERALIZATION; GLOBALIZATION

摘要

What political variables explain variations in subnational fiscal expenditures on interest payments on the debt? The author argues that the political budget cycle and center-right political party ideologyrather than the effective number of parties, alternation of power, ideological proximity between the central government and constituent units, or most forms of political party ideologycan help explain the level of expenditures on interest payment of subnational debt in India. The core empirical finding is that significant increases in expenditures on the debt occur the year in which a state assembly election is held in India.