Lobbying and uncertainty: Lobbying's varying response to different political events

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, Christopher A.; Boucher, Maxime
• 署名单位: University of Ottawa; University of Waterloo
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12385
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: strategies; access; POWER

摘要

Does political uncertainty affect whether lobbyists contact government officials? We suggest that the answer depends on the type of uncertainty introduced. Distinguishing between policy objective uncertainty-where organized interests and lobbyists are uncertain about the policy intentions of decision makers-and issue information uncertainty-where policymakers are uncertain about the technical details of issues-we hypothesize that whereas an increase in policy objective uncertainty leads to a decrease in lobbying, a rise in issue information uncertainty leads to more lobbying. We test the hypotheses with longitudinal data from the Canadian Lobbyists Registry measuring change in the number of times lobbyists have contacted government ministries each month from 2008 to 2018. The results suggest that lobbying intensity does respond differently to these types of uncertainty. Whereas events introducing issue information uncertainty have a statistically significant positive relationship with lobbying, events introducing policy objective uncertainty do not.