Organizational design and its consequences for administrative reform: Historical lessons from the US Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krause, George A.; Jin, Roger Qiyuan
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; California State University System; California State University Dominguez Hills
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12435
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS; Political control; reorganization; GOVERNMENT; EVOLUTION; bureau

摘要

The landmark U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (BAA) instituted a series of administrative reforms that proponents claimed would improve budgetary control, stability, and coherence. We maintain that the compatibility of governance structures between agency and system levels is critical for understanding why these administrative centralization efforts were successful in achieving these aims for some federal agencies but not others. The BAA reforms impact on budgetary outcomes is evaluated using panel data on major U.S. federal agencies between 1894 and 1940. Applying semiparametric heterogeneous treatment estimation techniques, we find compelling support that administrative centralization of the federal budgetary process enhanced budget stability and coherence for executive departments while resulting in a lower caliber of budgetary performance for independent agencies. These findings imply that system-level administrative centralization efforts may be effective only when public agencies are structurally amenable to such reforms.